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ABSTRACT
Who is Most Likely to Remain on Welfare?
by
Sonya M. Kessinger
Dr. Thomas M. Carroll, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Economics 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Recent welfare reform legislation imposes a five year limit on federal welfare 
benefits. This study examines earnings, family structure and race to determine their 
impact on the associated probabilities of remaining on welfare. Data o f families that 
received AFDC in the first year of a two-year period is analyzed. In the second year, 
some of these families stopped receiving benefits while others continued on welfare. 
Based on characteristics from the first year, a logit model develops the probabilities of 
leaving welfare rolls in the second year. These characteristics include earnings, 
employment, the average state benefit, age, gender, marital status, children, education and 
race. The results o f the model indicate that low earning, unemployed, unmarried women 
with children, in high-benefit states are least likely to leave welfare rolls. Findings on 
education and race show that a having a college degree and being black also increase the 
likelihood of staying on welfare.
Ill
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Welfare programs in the United States began around the turn of the century and 
were established for families in which the primary wage earner and source o f income was 
absent. These early programs were intended to provide assistance for widows and to keep 
families intact by preventing the institutionalization of children. Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families, or TANF, is the modem day welfare program, and it primarily serves single 
mothers with children under the age of 18. TANF replaces the long-time federal 
program. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) which was established in 
1935 as part of the Social Security Act.
Since the beginning of the Federal welfare program, there has been controversy 
about its success and social impact. Many welfare reform programs have been 
implemented since the late 1960’s with limited results. In the summer of 1996, Congress 
enacted yet another welfare reform program under the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Under this act, TANF replaces AFDC and implements a 
major shift in policy by placing a five year limit on the amount o f time families may 
receive Federal welfare assistance. Reducing welfare rolls and job training are additional
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2goals o f the legislation. States must reduce welfare rolls or lose a portion o f their Federal 
funding. The Federally mandated target welfare reductions are 25 percent by September 
1997 and 50 percent by the year 2002. Estimates predict that the first reduction will 
place the most employable welfare recipients in the labor force. This group generally has 
greater levels o f human capital than the second target reduction group which will be more 
difficult to employ. It is estimated that one-million new jobs will be needed in order to 
meet the first 25 percent reduction.’
Time limits on Federal assistance and welfare roll reductions are clear goals o f the 
welfare reform legislation, but it is not as clear how to move people into the work force. 
What groups should the government target for work programs or other types of 
assistance? This study examines the impact o f factors such as earnings, employment, 
family structure, education and race on the probabilities of leaving welfare in order to 
determine how these factors influence the likelihood of remaining on welfare.
Chapter 2 of this study provides a review of the literature. Chapter 3 describes the 
empirical model and the data used in the analysis. Chapter 4 presents the results of the 
empirical model, and Chapter 5 contains concluding remarks and policy 
recommendations.
‘ Bill Leonard, “Welfare Reform: A Deal for HR; Employment for Welfare Recipients,” Human 
Resources Magazine 42, (March 1997): 79, quoting Walter D. Broadnax, professor o f Public Policy at the 
University o f Maryland.
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Gary Becker is a pioneer o f the theory behind economics that relate to social 
issues such as race and family structure, including marriage, the sexual division o f labor, 
and child bearing. Becker bases his analyses on the premise that social and cultural 
events have economic consequences, and that individuals seek to maximize their utility 
through social and cultural mechanisms. Becker applies these same principals to 
marriage, investment in human capital and the demand for children. Elements o f  family 
structure, such as marriage, are conducive to division o f labor which has an economic 
impact on households. Becker believes that government aid lowers the cost o f children, 
thereby, increasing the demand for children. While children and family structure generate 
both monetary and opportunity costs, it is not clear that welfare causes families to have 
more children. Such a statement brings into focus the debate between the conservative 
and liberal views regarding the effects of welfare.
The conservative view generally opposes cash assistance to the poor maintaining 
that welfare creates poverty, encourages family break-ups and is responsible for the 
increase in out-of-wedlock births. The liberal view supports government assistance for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4the poor, maintaining that welfare reduces poverty and does not significantly contribute 
to social problems such as teen pregnancy. Causality is at the heart of the debate in the 
politiczil arena, with many studies on welfare attempting to prove the direction of 
causality.
This study differs firom many other economic studies on welfare in three ways. 
First, it does not attempt to prove the direction of causality; either welfare causes poverty 
and impacts family structure or vice-versa. However, the model is built on the underlying 
assumption that earnings and family structure affect the decision to receive welfare. This 
assumption is well supported by previous studies.^ The second way this study differs 
firom others is that it does not contrast families receiving welfare benefits with families in 
the general population. All of the households in the model received welfare in the first 
year o f a two-year period. In the second year, some o f the households stopped receiving 
benefits while others continued on welfare. Finally, this study differs firom most others in 
that it is not limited to single women and children who comprise the majority of welfare 
recipients. The purpose of this study is to determine which demographic groups are most 
likely to remain on welfare. Studies that relate to this topic examine the duration of 
welfare spells, the interdependence of demographic characteristics and welfare, and the 
impact of social-economic characteristics on the probability of receiving welfare.
 ^Studies that support the underlying hypothesis may be found in Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects 
o f  the U.S. Welfare Svstem: A Review (University o f Wisconsin: Madison, 1991): 24-45; Emily P. 
Hoffman, “Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Female Poverty,” Growth and Change 22 
(Spring 1991): 36-47; Saul D. Hoffinan and Greg J. Duncan, “The Effect o f  Incomes, Wages, and AFDC 
Benefits on Marital Distruption.” The Journal o f Human Resources 30 (Winter 1995): 19-41.
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5Groups with the longest welfare spells will probably have the most difficulty 
entering the labor force under the new welfare laws. Blank (1989) and Fitzgerald (1991) 
find that low educated women with more children tend to have the longest welfare spells. 
Fitzgerald also finds that longer welfare spells among black women are related to their 
lower probability o f marriage.
Besharov and Sullivan (1996) study the interdependence of income, family 
structure, race and welfare. According to the authors many divorced and unwed mothers 
escape welfare only through marriage. Women who were teen mothers are less likely to 
marry by the age of 28, and they are less likely to have a high school diploma. Tilly and 
Albelda (1994) find that family structure effects economic well-being. Single mothers 
tend to have very low earnings on average, while young childless couples tend to have 
high earnings. Black families and families with children present also tend to have lower 
family incomes. Byrne, Myers, and King (1991) find that pregnancies by unwed 
teenagers lead to fewer years of education completed.
Blank and Ruggles (1996) examine AFDC participation rates among eligible 
women to determine whether families participating in these programs have the greatest 
long term need and the most difficulty entering the work force. The authors find that 
increases in age, education and wages increase the probability of leaving welfare. Women 
with higher education levels are less likely to enroll in welfare programs even when they 
are eligible. This leads to the conclusion that these women anticipate higher future 
earnings and less of a need for welfare.
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6Barr and Hall (1981) study dependence on welfare based on characteristics such 
as race, education, age, the number o f children in the household and other characteristics. 
The authors conclude that wages are inversely related to dependence on welfare and that 
higher state AFDC payments tend to decrease the labor supply of welfare recipients. The 
authors also find that age, educational attainment, and the presence of preschool children 
are significant in predicting dependence on welfare. Previous studies on welfare 
dependence show that earnings and family structure generally impact the probability of 
receiving welfare.
While there are many studies examining the impact of welfare on Blacks and 
Whites, there are very few that target differences between Hispanics and other races. 
Studies that include Hispanics often focus on immigration and its relationship to the 
receipt of welfare.
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CHAPTERS 
EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION
In theory, the family head will seek to maximize utility by obtaining the desired 
level of goods and services for consumption. Families that meet eligibility requirements 
may continue to receive or to leave welfare. The decision to receive welfare is a labor 
demand function of earnings, the amount o f the state welfare benefit, and of leisure time.
T =f(wH, S, L ,x )+ e
Where T  represents the decision to receive welfare, w/7 equals earnings, S  equals the state 
benefit, L equals leisure, and x is a vector o f other explanatory control variables including 
race, age, children, gender and education. In theory, the family head will choose labor 
over welfare when the utility of wages is greater than utility derived from welfare. 
Families with exactly the same characteristics may make different choices and these 
differences are accounted for by the error term e. The decision to receive welfare is a 
binary variable; an individual will either choose to receive welfare or not to receive it.
In the model, annual earnings are a proxy for the market value of labor; it 
represents actual as-well-as potential earnings of an individual. The average state welfare 
benefit is a proxy for actual welfare cash payments, which are difficult to estimate.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Welfare benefits vary by state and almost always include Medicaid and a combination of 
food, housing and energy subsidies. State benefit levels have proven to be an important 
factor in individual choice of labor supply, migration, and kin support.^ In this study, 
benefit levels are included in order to estimate their impact on the probability o f  staying 
on welfare.
Marriage and education have far reaching economic consequences. Marriage 
provides for a greater division of labor between market and non-market activity, while 
education is an investment in human capital. Race, age, and gender are also included 
because they are strongly associated with poverty and the receipt of welfare.
The model examines characteristics in year one to determine their effect on the 
probability that a household will receive welfare in year two . More specifically, 
characteristics firom 1992 are examined to determine the conditional probability that a 
household will stop receiving welfare in 1993. The dependent variable (whether or not a 
household receives welfare in 1993) is a dummy variable which takes the value of 0 or 1. 
Households that did not receive welfare in the second year have a value of 0 while 
families that did receive welfare have a value of 1. To represent such behavior we us the 
logit model as follows:
Log (P\ /  l-P\) = a +5iXi + et
Pi / 1 -Pi = the odds that a household will receive welfare
 ^ See Moffitt, incentive Effects o f  the U.S. Welfare Svstem: A R eview , 24-32, 54-58; Lingxin 
Hao, “How Does a Single Mother Choose Kin and Welfare Support?” Social Science Research 24 (March 
1995): 1-27.
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Pi is a vector of the parameters to be estimated, the coefficients are interpreted as 
the log o f the odds that the individual will receive welfare; X is a vector of explanatory 
variables and e is the random error term. The explanatory variables included in the model 
are earnings, employment, average monthly state benefit, gender, age, age squared, 
marital status, children, children squared, high school diploma, some college, college 
diploma. Black and Hispanic. A description of the independent variables and their 
expected relationship with the dependent variables are summarized in Table 1.
The independent variable EARNINGS is wages obtained firom employment; it is 
distinct fi-om income which may come from other sources. A priori, the coefficients on 
earnings are expected to be negative because families with higher wages in year one are 
more likely to leave welfare roles in year two. Earnings is also a proxy for the labor 
market value o f an individual. Family-heads with higher labor market value are expected 
to be more likely to leave welfare. Increased earnings will ultimately cause families to 
lose their eligibility for welfare assistance altogether as income rises above state 
established levels.
Most welfare recipients are not employed,'* however, welfare recipients that do 
work are more likely to leave welfare for several reasons. This group may demonstrate a 
stronger work attachment, greater work experience, and may have less of a welfare 
stigma because they are employed. Consequently, welfare recipients that are employed
* From 1960s to the late 1980s the employment rates o f welfare recipients has been less than 20 
percent. See M offit Incentive Effects o f the U.S. Welfare Svstem: A Review. 22.
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have a higher labor market value which equates to greater levels o f human capital. In the 
model, employment is a dummy variable that is assigned a value of 0 if  the recipient is 
not working or, 1 if working.
The average benefit by state is a  proxy for the benefit level of the household. 
While the Federal Government provides matching funds, states determine the actual 
benefit levels.^ Households in high benefit states are more likely to remain on welfare 
because greater benefits increase the break-even point between welfare and work. 
Greater levels of welfare payments provide an incentive to stay out o f the work force. 
Therefore, the variable STATE BENEFIT is expected to be positively correlated to the 
receipt o f  welfare. Findings on this characteristic may be inconclusive because welfare 
payments tend to reflect the cost o f living in a particular state.
Welfare is a system primarily designed to help single mothers and their children; 
children in families that receive welfare generally live with their mothers in single-parent 
families, and women in general also tend to invest more human capital in home 
production.^ Therefore, male GENDER and MARRIED status are expected to be 
negatively correlated with the receipt of welfare. Fifteen percent of the sample is male 
and 25 percent are married. Marital status and gender are dummy variables with a value 
of either 0 or 1 and are defined as follows in the model:
* In 1994, the average state AFDC benefit was $352 per month including the District o f  Columbia, 
and ranged from a low o f SI 23 per month in Mississippi to a high of $740 in Alaska. Source: US 
Department o f  Commerce, Bureau o f  the Census, 1996 Statistical Abstract o f  the United Sates. Volume 
116.
* For a detailed discussion o f  division o f  labor in the household see Gary Becker, A Treastie on 
the Familv. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1981): 30-53.
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Gender: 0 = female
1 = male
Married: 0 = not married
1 = married
AGE is in the model to determine how it effects the probability of receiving 
welfare. It is hypothesized that the age o f the family head receiving welfare follows a 
quadratic function, and it includes the variable AGE SQUARED. Specifically, the 
probability of being on welfare rises with age to a point and then begins to decline. This 
specification o f the model allows one to calculate the age at which the likelihood of 
receiving welfare is the greatest. Family heads in the child bearing years may be more 
likely to receive welfare.
Children in the household increase the cost o f labor force participation and the 
presence and.number of cliildren in the home are directly related to the receipt o f welfare. 
One of the major costs of children is the cost of child care which is a deduction from 
wages. Consequently, the variable CHILDREN is anticipated to be positively correlated 
with the receipt of welfare.
The independent variable CHILDREN SQUARED is included in the model to 
determine the effect of additional children on the probability of receiving welfare. It is 
popularly hypothesized that women on welfare have more children to increase their 
welfare benefit; however, studies do not support this assertion.’ An alternative hypothesis 
is that children are resource intensive, and they increase both the monetary and
^Gregory Acs, “The Impact o f Welfare on Young M others’ Subsequent Childbearing Decisions,” 
Journal o f  Human Resources 3 1, (September 1996): 899-941.
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Table 1.— Summary o f Explanatory Variables
Variable Definition
Expected
Sign
Mean
(Standard
Deviation)
EARNINGS Wages o f  the sample in 1992 Negative 1,780
(3,936)
EMPLOYMENT All civilians in the sample who were 
employed at least one week during the 1992 
survey period
Negative .23
(.42)
STATE BENEFIT Average 1990 monthly state welfare benefit 
per households receiving AFDC
Positive 410
(148)
GENDER Male = 1 and female = 0 Negative .15
(.35)
AGE Age of the individual Positive 34.9
(12.2)
AGE SQUARED Age o f the individual squared Negative 1,365
(1,054)
MARRIED Marital status 1 =  married and 0 = not 
married
Negative .25
(.43)
CHILDREN Number o f  children in the household Positive 1.79
(1.46)
CHILDREN SQUARED The number o f  children squared Negative 5.35
(7.94)
HIGH SCHOOL 1 = high school diploma and 0 = less than 
high school diploma
Negative .62
(.49)
SOME COLLEGE 1 = some college and 0 = no college Negative .21
(-41)
COLLEGE DEGREE 1 = college degree and 0 = no college degree Negative .03
(.17)
BLACK 1 = Black and 0 = otherwise Positive .29
(-45)
HISPANIC 1 = Hispanic and 0 = otherwise Positive .23
(-42)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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opportunity costs of labor force participation. Single mothers on welfare have more 
children than single mothers not on welfare; 2.6 children versus 2.1 respectively. In the 
sample, the average number of children per household is 1.8. However, the sample is not 
limited to single mothers. A negative sign on the coefficient would show that the 
probability of receiving welfare increases with additional children up to a m a x im u m , then 
decreases. The equation would fit a parabola with a maximum value. A positive sign 
would suggest the opposite, and this equation would fit a parabola with a m in im u m  value. 
The expected sign of the variable CHILDREN SQUARED is negative, and we anticipate 
that children increase the log odds probability of receiving welfare at a decreasing rate.
Because education is an investment in human capital, the coefficients on HIGH 
SCHOOL, SOME COLLEGE and COLLEGE DIPLOMA are expected to be negative. 
Families receiving welfare generally have lower levels of educational attainment. The 
US Census Bureau reported that 48 percent of welfare mothers did not have a high school 
diploma in 1990 compared with 25 percent of the general population. Even fewer welfare 
recipients have some college or a college degree. In the sample, findings show that 62 
percent have a high school diploma, 23 percent have some college and 3 percent have a 
college diploma.
Race is also a significant factor in earnings and employment. According to the 
1990 census results. Black and Hispanic families had higher poverty rates than whites. 
Therefore, it is likely that the independent variables BLACK and HISPANIC will be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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directly related to the receipt of welfare. O f the sample, 29 percent are Black and 23 
percent are Hispanic.
The model includes observations o f 926 households, all o f which received AFDC 
at least one month in 1992. In 1993, 417 o f these households stopped receiving AFDC 
benefits and the remainder continued on welfare. All data for the model come from the 
1993-94 Current Population Survey compiled by the Bureau of Census o f  the US 
Department of Commerce.* Average benefit levels are taken from the Bureau of Census 
1990 Statistical Abstract and correspond to each observation by state code. While it is 
shown in the literature that the explanatory variables such as teen-pregnancy and 
education are inter-related, a correlation matrix of the independent variables shows that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in the model. A correlation matrix and other 
descriptive statistics are shown in the Appendix.
*Information from the Current Population Survey is lagged one-year. For example, the 1993 
Survey compiles findings from 1992.
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The estimated coefficients for the variables EARNS, EMPLOYMENT, STATE 
BENEFIT, GENDER, AGE, MARRIED, CHILDREN, CHILDREN- SQUARED, HIGH 
SCHOOL, SOME COLLEGE and BLACK are consistent with a priori expectations, while 
those for COLLEGE DIPLOMA and HISPANIC are not. All coefficients are significant 
except for the variables HIGH SCHOOL, SOME COLLEGE and HISPANIC. The only 
variable that is both significant and not consistent with a priori expectation is COLLEGE 
GRADUATE. Of the variables that are significant, all are significant at the 5 percent 
level except for COLLEGE GRADUATE and BLACK which are significant at the 10 
percent level. Table 2 summarizes the model results and shows whether the variable is 
consistent with a prior expectation.
The model results indicate that an annual income of only $1,000 would leave only 
11 percent o f the sample on welfare. This is an unexpectedly low amount that may not be 
meaningful. Further examination o f the data reveals that over 50 percent o f the sample 
reported zero or less earnings in 1993. This finding shows the complexity o f factors that
15
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Table 2—Estimated Coefficients of Earnings Potential and Family Structure
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Coefficient 
Consistent 
a priori?
Constant -2.024 ** 0.6198
EARNINGS -6.92E-05 ** 2.36E-05 yes
EMPLOYED -0.995 ** 0.1980 yes
STATE BENEFIT 0.002 ** 0.0005 yes
GENDER -0.541 ** 0.2200 yes
AGE 0.092 ** 0.0312 yes
AGESQ. -0.012 ** 0.0003 yes
MARRIED -1.084** 0.1916 yes
CHILDREN 0.552 ** 0.1384 yes
CHILDREN SQ. -0.044 * 0.0251 yes
HIGH SCHOOL -0.080 0.1758 yes
SOME COLLEGE -0.211 0.2097 yes
COLLEGE GRAD. 0.849 * 0.4856 no
BLACK 0.333 * 0.1865 yes
HISPANIC -0.146 0.2009 no
n = 926 observations 
log likelihood = -537.83 
p=0.55
* * significant at the 5 percent level
♦ significant at the 10 percent level
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may influence the decision to receive welfare, and it may largely be attributed to 
unreported income.’
The variable STATE BENEFIT is significant and negatively correlated with the 
receipt o f welfare, suggesting that higher benefits decrease the log odds that a household 
will stop receiving welfare. Lower state benefit levels decrease the break-even point 
between work and welfare making lower paying jobs more attractive to welfare 
recipients. Regional economies and poverty levels are also important determinants of 
welfare receipt. Washington DC had the highest rates of welfare recipients as a 
percentage o f  population at roughly 10 percent; South Dakota had the lowest at about 
one-half of one percent. The average was 4.8 percent.”
The signs on the coefficients for the variables GENDER and MARRIED are 
negative, consistent with the model expectations, and significant. Males are less likely to 
continue receiving welfare. Males can expect to earn more than women with the current 
wage gap between men and women around 71 percent.” Marriage is conducive to 
division of labor and it provides two potential wage-eamers in the family. It also 
provides two people to care for children and the household. Additionally, it is more
’ This finding is consistent with Blank and Ruggles (1996). The authors find that 50 percent o f 
families leaving welfare rolls continued to be eligible for benefits at the time o f  exit and, 30 percent 
remained eligible a year later. See “When Do Women Use AFDC and Food Stamps? The Dynamics o f 
Eligibility versus Participation” The Journal o f Human Resources 31. 57-89.
Source: US Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f  the Census, 1996 Statistical Abstract o f  the 
United Sates. Volume 116.
"  Lois Shaw et al. The Wage Gap: W om en‘s  an d  M en's Earnings (Washington DC: Women’s 
Policy Institute, 1997, accessed November 21, 1997); htp://www.iwpr.org/WAGEGAP.htm; Internet.
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difficult for married households to qualify for welfare because state requirements for two- 
parent families tend to be more restrictive.
The coefficients for the variables AGE  and AGE SQUARED are significant and 
show that the likelihood of being on welfare increases up to age 38, then decreases 
thereafter. This result is consistent with a prior expectations and appears to correspond 
with the period of young child rearing from roughly 18 to 39 years o f age. As women 
leave their child bearing years, they may face lower living expenses because they may no 
longer require child care. Older women may also become eligible for Social Security 
which does not carry the welfare stigma. This variable seems to fit well in the quadratic 
form and an omitted variable test on AGE SQUARED shows that it adds significant 
explanatory value to the model.”  Figure 1 shows a plot of the probability o f receiving 
welfare by age for the average recipient in the sample. The average values of the 
independent variables are used to plot the graph when the variables are numeric. For 
independent variables that are not numeric, the modes are used to calculate the graph. The 
probability o f receiving welfare increases up to age 38 then drops sharply by age 55.
The number of children in the home is significant and positively correlated with 
receiving welfare. Mothers that do not participate in the labor force in order to care for 
children forego potential wages. Mothers that do participate in the labor force incur the 
cost o f child care. The choice of at-home child care versus labor force participation is 
common for the general population as well as women receiving welfare. Figure 2 shows
The test is based on the ratio o f  the restricted maximized likelihood to the unrestricted 
maximized likelihood.
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how the number o f children effects the probability of staying on welfare for the average 
welfare participant in the sample who is White. This is compared with individuals that
Age and the Probability of Welfare
35.0 m m
20.0 Ï
15.0
Figure 1 Probability Table; Age and the Likelihood of Staying on Welfare
have the same characteristics but are Black. The model results indicate that a White 
single woman with two children has a 36 percent probability of staying on welfare in the 
following year. A woman with the same characteristics who is Black has a 56 percent 
probability o f staying on welfare.
The independent variable CHILDREN SQUARED is significant and shows that 
the probability of being on welfare increases with the number of children in the 
household up to 6 children. However, only 12 percent o f the sample had four or more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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children, and just over one percent had six or more children. Consequently, this finding 
is inconclusive, and it appears that a quadratic fimction on children may not fit the model. 
An omitted variable test shows that this variable does not add significant explanatory
power to the model. 13
Children and the Probability of Welfare
114
C hildren
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Figure 2: Probability o f Staying on Welfare for the Average Recipient Based on 
the Number of Children for Whites and Blacks
Having a high school diploma and some college is negatively correlated with the 
receipt of welfare. However, the findings on these terms are not statistically significant. 
According to the US Census Bureau, people with a high school diploma earn more on
’^ The omitted variable test shows that the likelihood ratio statistic is significant at approximately 
the 10 percent level. See footnote 9 for a description o f  the omitted variable test.
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average than those without such a degree and also have higher employment levels. The 
most surprising finding o f the model is the variable COLLEGE GRADUATE. A college 
degree increases the likelihood of staying on welfare. This variable is significant at the 
10 percent level and the coefficient is positive. It is unclear why this occurs, and this is a 
topic for future study. Individuals with a college degree may have a better understanding 
of the bureaucratic welfare system or they may have higher rates o f disabilities that afflict 
the chronically poor.
The variable BLACK is significant at roughly the 10 percent level and is directly 
related to welfare, while the variable HISPANIC is insignificant and negatively correlated 
to welfare. Many economists and sociologists maintain that structural differences and 
discrimination account for the difference in employment between racial groups. Blacks 
are more likely to live below the poverty level and are less likely to receive a high school 
diploma.’** Additionally, more Black children are bom into single parent families.’^
"Source: US Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f the Census, 1996 Statistical Abstract o f  the 
United Sates. Volume 116.
'^Douglas J. Besharov and Timothy S. Sullivan, “Welfare Reform and Marriage,” Public Interest 
125, (Fall 1996): 81-94.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose o f this study is to determine which demographic groups are most 
likely to stay on welfare and which groups are more likely to leave welfare. Findings 
show that single female heads in high benefit states, with minor children, and with low 
earnings and employment are the least likely group to leave the welfare roles. The most 
surprising finding relates to education, and a college diploma increases the likelihood of 
receiving welfare. It is important to distinguish this finding from other studies that 
examine participation rates among eligible welfare recipients. Family heads with a 
college degree are less likely to receive welfare in the first place. However, family-heads 
with a college degree that do go on welfare are more likely to remain on welfare.
Race is also a factor, and the coefficient on the variable Black is significant and 
positively correlated to the receipt of welfare. Blacks are more likely to remain on 
welfare. This racial group experiences higher rates of poverty and has a higher incidence 
o f single-parent families.
22
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The policy implications are that single mothers with children should be heavily 
targeted for work programs and other benefits such as subsidized child care. Additionally, 
the reasons why Black women and college educated welfare recipients are more likely to 
remain on welfare should be explored so that programs may be developed to respond to 
these groups. More generally, the model shows that as earnings and employment 
increase, the likelihood o f remaining on welfare decreases. Lower State AFDC benefit 
levels are significant in this study and, they may encourage families to rely more heavily 
on private resources such as extended family. Other general conclusions from the model 
are that marriage and fewer children are beneficial in ending the receipt of welfare. These 
results suggest the need for family plamiing, birth control, and education.
The number of households on welfare has declined since the welfare reform act of 
1996, and long-term trends in welfare participation have also declined. Long-term 
reduction’s in welfare are due primarily to changing demographics, reduced real welfare 
payments, and a strong economy. Future studies, perhaps incorporating post-welfare 
reform data, may be useful to test whether the predictions of this study hold true. 
Additionally, further studies may investigate findings on the impact of a college degree 
on staying on welfare.
Philip K. Robins, “ Explaining Recent Declines in AFDC Participation” Public Finance 
Quarterly. 18, April 1990): 236-237.
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APPENDIX
CORRELATION MATRIX AND
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
EARNS1 EMPLOYED1 AVGBENEFIT1 GENDER1
EARNS1 0.4506 -0.0698 0.0774
EMPLOYED 1 0.4506 -0.0462 -0.02277
AVEGENEF1T1 -0.0698 -0.0462 0.043
GENDER1 0.077 -0.0227 0.04 1
AGE1 0.0160 -0.0347 0.0791 0.18883
AGE1SQ -0.0119 -0.063 0.0640 0.01902
MARRIED1 0.1255 0.0883 0.06 0.22317
CHILDRN1 -0.046 -0.0484 -0.0443 -0.1465
CHILDRN1SQ -0.0497 -0.0665 -0.038 -0.08374
HIGHSCHOOL1 0.1669 0.1736 0.0713 -0.05751
S0MEC0L1 0.1239 0.1186 0.056 -0.06659
C0LGRAD1 0.0211 0.0430 0.0743 0.09129
BLACK1 0.0432 0.0206 -0.2958 -0.11007
HISPANIC1 -0.1376 -0.14863 0.2962 -0.01965
AGE1 AGE1SQ MARRIED1 CHILDRN1 CHILDRN1SQ
EARNS1 0.0160 -0.0119 0.1225 -0.0467 -0.04972
EMPLOYED1 -0.0347 -0.063 0.0883 -0.4843 -0.0665
AVEGENEFIT1 0.0791 0.0640 0.06 -0.04439 -0.038
GENDER1 0.1888 0.1902 0.2231 -0.1465 -0.0837
AGE1 0.9760 0.1230 -0.27815 -0.1490
AGE1SQ 0.9762 0.0930 -0.31943 -0.1782
MARRIED1 0.1230 0.0930 0.11468 0.1022
CHILDRN1 -0.2781 -0.3194 0.1146 1 0.9045
CHILDRN1SQ -0.1490 -0.1782 0.1022 0.90458
HIGHSCHOOL1 -0.0908 -0.1141 -0.031 -0.10576 -0.1304
S0MEC0L1 -0.0174 -0.0338 -0.052 -0.1059 -0.1241
C0LGRAD1 0.1134 0.1111 0.1244 0.12075 -0.0901
BLACK1 -0.0797 -0.0786 0.0617 0.10302 0.123
HISPANIC1 0.036 0.0366 -0.0010 0.06179 0.0170
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HIGHSCHOOL1 SOMECOL1 C0LGRAD1 BLACK1 1H1SPANIC1
EARNS1 0.1669 0.1239 0.0211 0.04326 -0.1376
EMPL0YED1 0.1736 0.1186 0.0430 0.02065 -0.1486
AVEGENEFIT1 0.0713 0.056 0.0743 -0.29583 0.2962
GENDER1 -0.0575 -0.0665 0.0912 -0.11007 -0.0196
AGE1 -0.0908 -0.0174 0.1134 -0.07976 0.036
AGE1SQ -0.1141 -0.0338 0.1111 -0.07865 0.0366
MARRIED 1 -0.031 -0.052 0.1244 -0.2155 -0.0010
CHILDRN1 -0.1057 -0.105 -0.1207 0.10602 0.0617
CHILDRN1SQ -0.1304 -0.1241 -0.0901 0.1235 0.0170
HIGHSCHOOL1 0.4080 0.1360 0.04493 -0.234
SOMECOL1 0.4080 0.3333 -0.04664 0.124
C0LGRAD1 0.1360 0.3333 -0.03983 -0.0955
BLACK1 0.0449 -0.0466 -0.0398 1 -0.3520
HISPANIC1 -0.234 -0.124 -0.0955 -0.35201
H1GHSCHOOL1 SOMECOL1 COLGRAD1 BLACK1 H1SPANIC1
Mean 0.62 0.21 0.03 0.29 0.23
Median 1 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Std. Dev 0.486 0.409 0.168 0.454 0.423
Skewness -0.489 1.403 5.594 0.928 1.261
Kurtosis 1.238 2.968 32.291 1.861 2.588
Jarque-Bera 156.685 303.863 37933.485 183.070 251.854
Probability 9.47E-35 1.04E-66 O.OOE+00 1.77E-40 2.04E-55
Observations 926 926 926 926 926
EARNS1 EMPLOYED1 ,AVGBENEFIT1 GENDER1
Mean 1780.3 0.23 410.3 0.15
Median 0 0 380 0
Maximum 28000 1 750 1
Minimum 0 0 122 0
Std. Dev 3935.491 0.420 148.333 0.354
Skewness 3.116 1.290 0.018 1.994
Kurtosis 14.286 2.662 2.019 4.976
Jarque-Bera 6412.831 261.072 37.192 764.324
Probability O.OOE+00 2.04E-57 8.39E-09 1.07E-166
Observations 926 926 926 926
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AGE1 AGE1SQ MARRIED1 CHILDRN1 CHILDRN1SQ
Mean 34.9 1365.3 0.25 1.79 5.35
Median 33 1089 0 2 4
Maximum 84 7056 1 9 81
Minimum 15 225 0 0 0
Std. Dev 12.172 1054.116 0.431 1.460 7.942
Skewness 1.213 2.301 1.178 0.910 3.745
Kurtosis 4.849 9.722 2.385 4.347 25.680
Jarque-Bera 358.917 2560.772 228.562 197.796 22012.24
Probability 1.15E-78 O.OOE+00 2.34E-50 1.12E-43 O.OOE+00
Observations 926 926 926 926 926
HIGHSCH00L1 :SOMECOL1 1COLGRAD1 BLACK1 1HISPANIC1
Mean 0.62 0.21 0.03 0.29 0.23
Median 1 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Std. Dev 0.486 0.409 0.168 0.454 0.423
Skewness -0.489 1.403 5.594 0.928 1.261
Kurtosis 1.238 2.968 32.291 1.861 2.588
Jarque-Bera 156.685 303.863 37933.485 183.070 251.854
Probability 9.47E-35 1.04E-66 O.OOE+00 1.77E-40 2.04E-55
Observations 926 926 926 926 926
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